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Neuroimaging studies have found that sensorimotor systems are engaged when
participants observe actions or comprehend action language. However, most of these
studies have asked the binary question of whether action concepts are embodied or
not, rather than whether sensory and motor areas of the brain contain graded amounts
of information during putative action simulations. To address this question, we used
repetition suppression (RS) functional magnetic resonance imaging to determine if
functionally-localized motor movement and visual motion regions-of-interest (ROI) and
two anatomical ROIs (inferior frontal gyrus, IFG; left posterior middle temporal gyrus,
pMTG) were sensitive to changes in the exemplar (e.g., two different people “kicking”)
or representational format (e.g., photograph or schematic drawing of someone “kicking”)
within pairs of action images. We also investigated whether concrete versus more
symbolic depictions of actions (i.e., photographs or schematic drawings) yielded different
patterns of activation throughout the brain. We found that during a conceptual task,
sensory and motor systems represent actions at different levels of specificity. While
the visual motion ROI did not exhibit RS to different exemplars of the same action or
to the same action depicted by different formats, the motor movement ROI did. These
effects are consistent with “person-specific” action simulations: if the motor system is
recruited for action understanding, it does so by activating one’s own motor program for
an action. We also observed significant repetition enhancement within the IFG ROI to
different exemplars or formats of the same action, a result that may indicate additional
cognitive processing on these trials. Finally, we found that the recruitment of posterior
brain regions by action concepts depends on the format of the input: left lateral occipital
cortex and right supramarginal gyrus responded more strongly to symbolic depictions of
actions than concrete ones.
Keywords: actions, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), motor system, semantic memory, visual
motion
INTRODUCTION
A growing body of research suggests that our knowledge about the
world is tightly intertwined with the brain’s systems for percep-
tion and action (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Decety
and Grèzes, 2006; see Barsalou, 2008 for a review). On these
“embodied” accounts of semantic memory, sensory and motor
states from real-world experiences are re-activated, or simulated,
when we understand the meaning of words or other symbols
(Barsalou, 1999, 2003; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). In part because
of the discovery of neurons in monkeys that fire both during
action execution and observation (e.g., Di Pellegrino et al., 1992),
researchers have been particularly interested in understanding
the way in which the meanings of human actions and events
are represented within the semantic system (Pulvermüller, 1999;
Vigliocco et al., 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005; Aziz-Zadeh and
Damasio, 2008; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). The extant evi-
dence indicates that when we comprehend language referring to
actions or think about the actions depicted in photographs or
drawings, we engage, at least in part, sensory and motor systems
in the brain (e.g., Kable et al., 2002; Hauk et al., 2004; Assmus
et al., 2007; Raposo et al., 2009; Saygin et al., 2010). For example,
reading words referring to actions performed with different body
parts (e.g., “pick,” “lick,” “kick”) activates primarymotor and pre-
motor cortex in a somatotopic way (Hauk et al., 2004; see also
Boulenger et al., 2009). Similarly, when participants view or make
semantic decisions about actions in drawings or photographs
(Kable et al., 2002; Assmus et al., 2007), or comprehend sen-
tences describing motion events (Pirog Revill et al., 2008; Saygin
et al., 2010 see Gennari, 2012 for a review), activation is observed
within area MT+, a part of the visual system specialized for pro-
cessing motion (Huk et al., 2002). Thus, action concepts may
be represented within the same areas of the brain involved in
actually executing and perceiving dynamic actions (see Watson
et al., 2013 for a meta-analysis of this literature). (Throughout the
manuscript, we will use “action concepts” as shorthand for “the
semantic representations of actions”.)
However, most studies on the neural basis of action concepts
have asked the binary question of whether action concepts are
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embodied or not, rather than whether action concepts contain
graded amounts of sensory and motor information during
putative action simulations (see Chatterjee, 2010; Willems and
Francken, 2012 for similar critiques). One possible scenario is
that action concepts typically evoke the same simulation: different
exemplars of an action (e.g., different photographs of someone
diving) or different representational formats (e.g., photographs,
drawings, or words) produce the same response within sensory
and motor systems. Alternatively, neural activity in sensory and
motor systems may differ each time an action concept is engaged,
preserving details specific to the particular exemplar of an action
or format of the input.
In the present study, we addressed this question by examining
neural responses to action concepts evoked by different exem-
plars of actions and by distinct visual formats. First, we used a
repetition suppression (RS) paradigm (Grill-Spector andMalach,
2001; Maccotta and Buckner, 2004; Grill-Spector et al., 2006) to
determine whether functionally-localized motor movement and
visual motion (area MT+) regions-of-interest (ROIs) were sen-
sitive to changes in the exemplar (different people performing
the same action) or format (perceptually-rich photographs vs.
pared-down, schematic drawings) between pairs of action images.
If visual motion or motor areas exhibit decreases in activation
(RS) to pairs of images depicting different exemplars of the same
action or the same action in different formats, relative to pairs
of different action images, it would suggest that an action con-
cept (e.g., running) always evokes the same embodied response.
On the other hand, an absence of RS for changes in exemplar
or format would be consistent with the hypothesis that sensory
and motor simulations preserve instance-specific details about
actions.
In addition to these functional ROIs, we also looked for RS
within left posterior middle temporal gyrus (pMTG) and bilat-
eral inferior frontal gyri (IFG), two areas of the brain consis-
tently implicated in the representation of semantic knowledge
of actions (e.g., Kilner et al., 2009; Kalénine et al., 2010). The
proximity of pMTG and IFG to visual motion and motor sys-
tems, respectively, enabled us to test the claim that areas of the
brain adjacent to modality-specific regions may represent more
abstract information derived from those modalities (Plaut, 2002;
Thompson-Schill, 2003; Chatterjee, 2008, 2010).
Examining RS within these ROIs allowed us to determine
the specificity of action knowledge represented in sensory and
motor systems. Additionally, we tested whether photographs of
actions and schematic drawings of actions elicited different pat-
terns of activation throughout the brain; we refer to these two
types of visual depictions of actions as different “representa-
tional formats.” In contrast to perceptually-rich photographs,
schematic drawings preserve the fundamental analog structure
of the things they represent while eliminating specific perceptual
details (Peirce, 1955; Deacon, 1997). As a result, schematic draw-
ings represent meaning more symbolically than photographs, but
less symbolically than words. Consequently, schematic drawings
may also engage more abstract mental representations than those
engaged by concrete percepts, and less abstract representations
than those engaged by purely-symbolic language (Chatterjee,
2001). Recent evidence from stroke patients (Amorapanth et al.,
2012; Kranjec et al., 2013) implicates the right supramarginal
gyrus as harboring such pared-down schematic visual represen-
tations.
Additionally, on a graded view of conceptual representation
in the brain (Thompson-Schill, 2003; Chatterjee, 2008, 2010),
more abstract representations of knowledge are located adjacent
to primary sensory and motor cortices. Given that schematic
drawings are a more symbolic representational format than pho-
tographs, we predict that they will activate brain regions adjacent
to those activated by more concrete photographs. Alternatively,
areas of the brain involved in representing action concepts may
not distinguish between these different representational formats.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen participants (7 male; Mage = 25.3 years, range: 20–34
years) participated in the study. All participants were right-
handed, native speakers of English with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of neurologic or psychiatric illness.
All participants gave informed consent in accordance with the
procedures of the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review
Board and were paid $20/h for their participation. One partici-
pant was excluded from the study for having average task accuracy
less than 2.5 standard deviations from the group’s mean accuracy.
STIMULI
Stimuli were 30 photographs (hereafter, “pictures”) and 30
schematic drawings (hereafter, “drawings”) of humans per-
forming common transitive or intransitive actions. We created
schematic drawings by tracing with a thick red line the config-
uration of the actor’s body in each picture. Drawings of transitive
actions contained a simple black shape or line representing the
recipient object; drawings of intransitive actions contained a black
line representing the ground or other relevant background indica-
tor. To ensure that pictures and drawings were equally recogniz-
able, we collected name agreement measurements from 20 pilot
participants. The two image formats did not differ on average
name agreement [Mpictures = 97.9%, SDpictures = 2.5;Mdrawings =
97.7%, SDdrawings = 2.9; t(29) = 0.43, p > 0.8].
Pictures and drawings depicted six unique actions: three tran-
sitive actions (“kick”, “pull”, “push”) and three intransitive actions
(“stretch”, “dive”, “walk”). Each action was represented in the
stimulus set by five pictures and five corresponding drawings
showing different exemplars of the action (e.g., five different
people diving).
Each experimental trial contained a prime image and a tar-
get image. We paired the 30 pictures and 30 drawings in different
ways to form the two conditions of interest (Figure 1). First,
we manipulated the representational format of the prime and
target (“format type”). The prime and target could both be
pictures (Picture/Picture), both drawings (Drawing/Drawing),
or the prime could be a picture and the target, a drawing
(Picture/Drawing). Critically, we did not examine statistically the
fourth combination of format types, Drawing/Picture trials; these
trials served as filler trials. We adopted this approach to avoid
unnecessarily testing conditions with no unique hypotheses. By
examining Picture/Drawing trials, we could assess whether RS
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of experimental stimuli. Each trial consisted of a
prime and target image presented in succession. Images on “Same”
trials depicted the same instance of the same action. Images on
“Alternate” trials depicted different instances of the same action. Images
on “Different” trials depicted different actions. Image pairs were either
two photographs (“Picture/Picture”), two schematic drawings
(“Drawing/Drawing”), or a photograph followed by a schematic drawing
(“Picture/Drawing”).
occurred between format types. If we used Drawing/Picture tri-
als to address the same question a second time, we would increase
the likelihood of a finding a false positive result.
Second, we manipulated the perceptual and/or conceptual
similarity between the prime and target (“action similarity”),
where “conceptual similarity” refers to the same action (e.g.,
“kicking”). On “Same” trials, the prime and target depicted the
same exemplar of the same action; thus, prime and target were
similar perceptually and conceptually. On “Alternate” trials, the
prime and target depicted different exemplars of the same action;
thus, the prime and target were similar conceptually but not per-
ceptually. On “Different” trials, the prime and target depicted
different actions and so were unrelated both perceptually and
conceptually. Note that although prime and target were always
perceptually similar on Same trials, the degree of this perceptual
similarity was greater for Picture/Picture and Drawing/Drawing
trials (i.e., the identical picture or drawing as prime and tar-
get) relative to Picture/Drawing trials (i.e., the picture and the
schematic drawing derived from it as prime and target).
In sum, we manipulated the format type (3) and action simi-
larity (3) of the image pairs. Each cell of our design contained 30
behavioral trials, yielding 270 trials of interest. Given our initial
set of 30 pictures and 30 drawings, only 30 prime-target pairings
were possible for Same trials of each format type (Picture/Picture,
Drawing/Drawing, Picture/Drawing). To create Alternate and
Different trials, we selected randomly 30 prime-target pairs from
all possible pairings at each level of format type and action sim-
ilarity. We used these same procedures to select Drawing/Picture
filler trials.
PROCEDURE
During the experiment, participants decided if the prime and
target images depicted “the same or different actions” at a
conceptual level. The correct response for Same and Alternate
trials was “yes” (e.g., prime and target both depict the same exem-
plar, or different exemplars, of “diving”). The correct response for
Different trials was “no” (e.g., prime and target depict “diving”
and “kicking”). Prior to entering the scanner, participants com-
pleted 5min of practice trials to ensure that they understood the
task. To prevent participants from exploiting low-level visual cues
to make their decisions (e.g., correspondences between the image
boundaries of prime and target), prime and target images were
presented at different random locations on the screen.
On each trial, participants viewed the prime image for
1000ms, followed by a 250ms fixation cross. Then, the target
image appeared for 1750ms, during which the participant made
his or her response. In total, each trial lasted 3000ms. On null
trials, participants viewed a fixation cross for 3000ms. Trials
were separated by a 500ms blank screen. The experiment was
presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA) on a computer connected to a projector. Manual
responses and reaction times (RTs) were recorded with a button
box held by participants with both hands. “Yes” or “no” responses
were made by pressing a button with the left or right thumb. Half
of the participants indicated “yes” responses with a right but-
ton press and “no” responses with a left button press; the other
half of participants were assigned the reverse pattern. While in
the scanner, participants completed 270 trials of interest, 90 filler
trials, and 90 null trials. Trials were presented in five scanning
runs of 5.4min each. Each run began with 9 s of introductory
screens. Following these “ready screens,” experimental, filler, and
null trials occurred randomly within and across runs for each
participant.
After the experimental trials, participants completed two func-
tional localizer scans. During the visual motion (area MT+)
localizer, participants passively viewed four 32.5-s blocks each of
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moving (flow fields) or stationary white dots on a black back-
ground (Bavelier et al., 2001; Saygin et al., 2010). During the
motor movement localizer, participants were instructed via com-
puter screen to move the right hand, left hand, right foot, and left
foot continuously for 20 s, or to rest for 20 s (Hauk et al., 2004;
Boulenger et al., 2009; Raposo et al., 2009). Each type of block
was presented 4 times.
DATA ACQUISITION
We collected structural and functional data on a 3.0 Tesla Siemens
Trio scanner using an eight-channel head coil. We acquired
high-resolution T1-weighted structural images using aMP-RAGE
pulse sequence and near-isotropic voxels (0.98 × 0.98 × 1mm).
T2∗-weighted echo-planar images were collected during the five
experimental scanning runs (104 volumes each), the MT+ local-
izer (91 volumes), and the motor localizer (102 volumes) (repeti-
tion time = 3 s; echo time = 30ms; flip angle = 90◦; field of view
= 220mm; slice thickness = 3mm; matrix size = 64 × 64; voxel
size = 3.4 × 3.4 × 3mm). Each functional volume consisted of
50 axial slices that covered the whole cerebral cortex.
fMRI DATA PREPROCESSING
Imaging data was preprocessed and analyzed using the FMRIB
Software Library (FSL version 4.1; http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/
fsl). The first three volumes of each functional run were discarded
to allow for steady state magnetization. Functional data were slice
timing corrected using sinc interpolation, motion corrected, and
high-pass filtered (0.01Hz). For each participant, functional data
from each run were registered to a participant’s high-resolution
structural image using FMRIB’s Linear Registration Tool with
7◦ of freedom. One set of functional data for use in region-of-
interest analyses was kept in each participant’s native space and
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 4mm (full-width at half-
maximum). A second copy of functional data for use in group-
level analyses was registered to Montreal Neurological Institute
standard space (MNI-152) using linear registration with 12◦ of
freedom and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8mm.
FIRST-LEVEL ANALYSES
We first modeled each functional scanning run separately for each
participant with FMRIB’s FEAT (fMRI Expert Analysis Tool). We
used an event-related model in which the events of interest began
with the onset of the prime image and ended with the offset of
the target image. Events were modeled as single impulses con-
volved with FSL’s double-gamma hemodynamic response func-
tion (HRF), along with the event’s temporal derivative. Regressors
were created for each format type/action similarity combi-
nation [e.g., Picture/Picture(Same), Picture/Picture(Alternate),
etc.], and for filler trials and null trials. Contrasts of interest were
computed at the first level using linear combinations of these
regressors.
HIGHER-LEVEL ANALYSES
For each participant, contrasts between conditions modeled
within a run were combined at the second-level using a fixed
effects model within FMRIB’s Local Analysis of Mixed Effects
(FLAME). Finally, contrasts intended for third-level, group anal-
yses were combined across participants using a mixed effects
model (FLAME1+2). Resulting group-level maps of z-statistics
were thresholded at z > 2.3 with a corrected cluster significance
threshold of p < 0.05 (Worsley et al., 1992). In order to com-
pare the location of the visual motion ROI with our group-level
results, we also computed the location of the visual motion ROI at
the group level. To more precisely determine the anatomical loca-
tion of this region, we thresholded this analysis using voxel-based,
rather than cluster-based, thresholding (GRF-theory-based max-
imum height thresholding with p < 0.05, corrected) (Worsley
et al., 1992).
REGION-OF-INTEREST ANALYSES
For region-of-interest (ROI) analyses, we used FMRIB’s
Featquery tool to compute, for each participant, the mean con-
trast of parameter estimates in each ROI for each condition [i.e.,
Picture/Picture (Same), Picture/Picture (Alternate), etc.] minus
null (fixation) trials. With this data, within-subject RS effects
were evaluated using SPSS software.We looked for RS within each
ROI by looking for effects of action similarity (Same, Alternate,
Different) and format type (Picture/Picture, Drawing/Drawing,
Picture/Drawing) using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA.
When we observed an interaction between action similarity and
format type, p-values from tests of simple effects were corrected
for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Sidak method.
Our two ROIs of primary interest were defined functionally for
each participant. Visual motion ROIs were defined by contrasting
blocks in which participants perceived moving vs. stationary dots
(see above). The resulting map of z-values for this contrast was
thresholded first at a False Discovery Rate (FDR) (Nichols and
Holmes, 2002) of q = 0.000001. (Here, we used the FDR method
given that it controls the family-wise error rate without being
overly conservative for low smoothness data with few degrees
of freedom, Nichols and Hayasaka, 2003.) We then selected the
largest cluster in each hemisphere that survived this threshold and
fell within lateral occipital cortex. This anatomical constraint was
applied rarely and excluded clusters that emerged in the occipi-
tal poles. Using this procedure, visual motion ROIs were localized
for 10 participants. For 2 participants, no voxels survived at this
threshold, so we used a more lenient threshold of q = 0.05. We
note that using a more lenient threshold to identify ROIs in
some participants does not bias us to find differences between the
experimental conditions. On the contrary, by using voxels that
respond less strongly to visual motion, we may have increased
noise in our analyses, making it more difficult to detect effects. For
3 participants, no visual-motion-preferring voxels were detected
even at a relaxed threshold. The average visual motion ROI had a
volume of 7995mm3 (SD = 5420).
Motor movement ROIs were defined in each participant by
contrasting the movement of each effector (left hand, right hand,
left foot, right foot) with rest (see above). Resulting z-maps for
each of these contrasts were thresholded with the same general
procedure described for the visual motion ROI. For each effector,
we selected the largest cluster that survived the threshold. Clusters
for each of the four effectors were then combined to form a partic-
ipant’s entire motor movement ROI. In 10 participants, a motor
ROI was identified at q = 0.0000001; for 2 other participants, the
threshold was relaxed to q = 0.05. We were unable to identify
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science May 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 494 | 4
Watson et al. Specificity of action knowledge
a motor movement ROI in 3 participants. The average motor
movement ROI had a volume of 22813mm3 (SD = 11111).
Figure 2 depicts the overlap of participants’ visual motion
and motor movement ROIs transformed into MNI-152 standard
space. The location of visual motion ROIs within lateral temporo-
occipital cortex agrees with previous localizations of area MT+
(e.g., Dumoulin et al., 2000). Motor movement ROIs primarily
covered lateral and medial pre- and post-central gyri.
To ensure that RS within the motor movement ROI could not
be attributed to lower-level processes, we made a further adjust-
ment to analyses performed within each participant’s motor
movement ROI. In the experimental task, trials on which a par-
ticipant responds “yes” (i.e., Same and Alternate trials) occurred
more frequently than “no” trials (i.e., Different trials). Since par-
ticipants used one hand more often throughout the experiment,
it is possible that we could observe a decrease in neural activity
for Same/Alternate trials relative to Different trials within motor
regions due to manual response priming (i.e., repeated use of
one hand for responding). Therefore, we calculated the effects of
Same/Alternate trials (relative to null trials) and Different trials
(relative to null trials) onlywithin the hemisphere ipsilateral to the
manual response for each condition. In other words, for analyses
within the motor movement ROI, we only considered activation
within the hemisphere not responsible for a participant’s button
press. For participants who responded “yes” with the right hand
(to Same/Alternate trials), mean contrast of parameter estimates
for Same and Alternate trials relative to null were computed only
within the right hemisphere motor movement ROI; mean con-
trast of parameter estimates for Different trials (“no” responses
made with the left hand) were computed only within the left
hemisphere motor movement ROI. In using this procedure, we
ensured that RS effects observed within motor regions could be
attributable only to the experimental manipulations rather than
priming of manual responses.
In addition to these two functionally-defined ROIs, we created
two anatomical ROIs: bilateral IFG and left pMTG. Each area was
taken from the Harvard-Oxford Cortical Atlas that is registered
to MNI-152 standard space and included in the FSL distribution.
ROIs in standard space were transformed into each participant’s
native space using linear registration (FLIRT). For each ROI, we
excluded any voxels that were also included in a participant’s
FIGURE 2 | Overlap of visual motion and motor movement
regions-of-interest across participants. Each participant’s ROIs have
been transformed into standard MNI space. Color bars denote the number
of participants having a given ROI at each voxel. Overlap is displayed at a
search depth of 3mm.
functionally-defined visual motion and motor movement ROIs
to ensure that observations within the ROIs were independent
of each other. Similarly, participants for whom visual motion
(n = 3) and motor movement (n = 3) ROIs could not be located
were excluded from IFG and pMTG ROI analyses given that we
could not rule out overlap between functionally-responsive and
anatomically-localized areas in these participants. Finally, given
the contribution of IFG to action execution (e.g., Caspers et al.,
2010; Press et al., 2012), we analyzed activation with the IFG ROI
in the same manner as the motor movement ROI (see above).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSES
We used a two-way repeated measures ANOVA to look for effects
of action similarity (Same, Alternate, and Different) and format
type (Picture/Picture, Drawing/Drawing, and Picture/Drawing)
on accuracy. We found a significant effect of action similarity
[F(2, 28) = 28.7, p < 0.001] and a marginal effect of format type
[F(2, 28) = 2.7, p = 0.08] (Figure 3A). The interaction between
action similarity and format type was not significant. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that participants were significantly less
accurate on Alternate trials relative to Different (p = 0.02) and
Same (p = 0.02) trials, and significantly less accurate on Different
trials than Same trials (p = 0.01). Pairwise comparisons between
format types showed that participants were significantly less accu-
rate on Drawing/Drawing trials than Picture/Picture trials (p =
0.03); however, the mean difference in accuracy between these
conditions was very small (1.6%). No other pairwise differences
between format types reached significant.
Reaction time analyses were conducted only for correct trials.
There was a significant effect of action similarity on partici-
pants’ RTs [F(2, 28) = 67.2, p < 0.001] and a significant interac-
tion between action similarity and format type [F(4, 56) = 30.0,
p < 0.001] (Figure 3B). The effect of format type was not sig-
nificant. To explore the interaction, we calculated simple effects
between levels of action similarity for each format type. For every
format type, participants responded to Same trials significantly
faster than either Alternate trials (all p < 0.001) or Different tri-
als (all p < 0.001). For Picture/Picture trials, participants also
responded more quickly to Alternate trials than Different trials
(p = 0.005). For Drawing/Drawing and Picture/Drawing trials,
however, there was no significant difference between RTs to
Alternate and Different trials. When jointly considering partici-
pants’ RTs and accuracy, we note that participants’ lower accuracy
on Alternate trials may not reflect errors, per se, but individual dif-
ferences in whether a participant believed the two images indeed
depicted the same action. On the other hand, reaction time anal-
yses were only carried out on trials in which participants accepted
identical and alternate exemplars and rejected images of different
actions as depicting the same action; RTs thus reflect the time to
accumulate sufficient information to make each type of decision
(e.g., Ratcliff, 1978).
ROI ANALYSES
Visual motion and motor movement ROIs were functionally-
localized for each participant. For each participant, we calcu-
lated the mean contrast of parameter estimates between each
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FIGURE 3 | Behavior on the experimental tasks while in the scanner. Mean accuracy (A) and reaction time (B) for each condition. Error bars denote plus or
minus one standard error of the mean.
condition and null (fixation) trials within these regions. Then,
we looked for effects of the action similarity (Same, Alternate,
Different) and format type (Picture/Picture, Drawing/Drawing,
and Picture/Drawing) of the prime and target images using a two-
way repeated measures ANOVA. Within the visual motion ROI,
there were significant effects of action similarity [F(2, 22) = 8.3,
p = 0.002] and format type [F(2, 22) = 7.0, p = 0.005], and a
marginally significant interaction between the two [F(4, 44) = 2.2,
p = 0.08] (Figure 4A). Simple effects between levels of action
similarity for each format type showed significant suppression
for Same trials relative to Different (p = 0.03) and relative to
Alternate (p = 0.003) trials only for the Picture/Picture condi-
tion. No other pairwise comparisons were significant. Thus, the
visual motion ROI exhibited RS only when the prime and target
images were identical, perceptually-rich photographs of actions.
We evaluated RS effects within the motor movement ROI only
within the hemisphere ipsilateral to each condition’s expected
manual response (see Materials and Methods). We observed a
significant effect of action similarity [F(2, 22) = 8.4, p = 0.002]
but no effect of format type or interaction between the two
(Figure 4B). Planned comparisons between each level of action
similarity showed significant suppression for Same trials rel-
ative to Different (p = 0.006) and Alternate trials (p = 0.01).
Suppression for Alternate trials relative to Different trials was
not significant but showed a trend in that direction (p = 0.09).
However, the main effect of action similarity was significantly fit
by a linear contrast between Same, Alternate, and Different lev-
els [F(1, 22) = 11.5, p = 0.006], suggesting that RS occurred in
the motor movement ROI when the prime and target images
referred to the same basic action, even if different exemplars or
representational formats.
Next, we looked for effects of action similarity and format
type within areas of the brain near to functionally-localized
visual motion and motor movement ROIs. Within left pMTG,
we observed significant effects of format type [F(2, 22) = 9.5,
p = 0.001] and action similarity [F(2, 22) = 3.8, p = 0.04], but
no significant interaction between the two (Figure 4C). Planned
comparisons between each level of action similarity revealed
significant suppression for Same trials relative to Alternate tri-
als (p = 0.03) and marginally significant suppression for Same
trials relative to Different trials (p = 0.08). There was no dif-
ference between Alternate and Different trials. Planned com-
parisons between each format type indicated significantly less
activation within left pMTG for Picture/Picture trials relative
to Drawing/Drawing (p = 0.01) or Picture/Drawing trials (p =
0.001), and Drawing/Drawing and Picture/Drawing trials were
not significantly different from one another. Thus, left pMTG
exhibited suppression when the prime and target were identical
but not when they were merely different exemplars of the same
action. And, this area of the brain was more strongly activated
overall when the prime or target image was a schematic drawing
of an action.
Finally, we examined RS effects within the IFG. As with the
motor movement ROI, we analyzed activation within the hemi-
sphere ipsilateral to each condition’s expected manual response
(see Materials and Methods). Within IFG, we found a signifi-
cant effect of action similarity [F(2, 22) = 8.1, p = 0.002]. There
was no effect of format type or interaction (Figure 4D). Planned
comparisons between levels of action similarity revealed no differ-
ence between activation on Same and Different trials (p = 0.53).
Surprisingly, we also observed significant enhancement (i.e., an
increase) for Alternate trials relative to both Different (p = 0.02)
and Same (p < 0.001) trials. This result indicates that IFG exhib-
ited not suppression, but increased activity when the images
depicted different exemplars of the same action.
Although these analyses examined the patterns of RS effects
between conditions, we note that the overall magnitude of values
within each ROI reflects the degree to which an ROI was more
active during the task than fixation. For example, large mean
contrasts of parameter estimates within the visual motion ROI
likely reflect the richer visual input present on experimental trials
relative to fixation crosses.
WHOLE-BRAIN ANALYSES
To determine if concrete and more symbolic representations
of actions activate distinct areas throughout the brain, we also
used a whole-brain, group-level analysis to compare activation
for perceptually-rich photographs of actions (Picture/Picture
trials) with activation for schematic drawings of actions
(Drawing/Drawing trials). Because Same and Alternate trials were
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FIGURE 4 | Region-of-interest analyses. Visual motion (A) and motor
movement (B) areas were functionally-localized in each participant. Left
pMTG (C) and bilateral IFG (D) were defined anatomically using the
Harvard-Oxford cortical atlas. Bars reflect the mean contrast of parameter
estimates between each condition and null (fixation) trials. Error bars denote
plus or minus one standard error of the mean.
hypothesized to exhibit RS effects, we only compared Different
trials for each of these two formats. Relative to Drawings, Pictures
activated a large, bilateral cluster that began in the occipital poles
and extended into the fusiform gyri in both hemispheres (vol-
ume = 32710mm3; maximum z-value = 6.01; MNI coordinates
of maximum: x = 16, y = −96, z = −8) (Figure 5, red/yellow).
Relative to Pictures, Drawings activated a cluster in the right
supramarginal gyrus and superior parietal lobule (volume =
3096mm3; maximum z-value = 3.78; MNI coordinates of maxi-
mum: x = 32, y = −52, z = 52) (Figure 5, light blue/dark blue).
Drawings also activated a smaller cluster within left lateral occipi-
tal cortex (volume = 1782mm3; maximum z-value = 3.51; coor-
dinates of maximum: x = −58, y = −66; z = −6). The majority
of voxels in this cluster were located anterior to the typical loca-
tion of area MT+, as reported in other studies (Dumoulin et al.,
2000) and within our own participant group (Figure 5, group-
level visual-motion-preferring voxels shown in light green/dark
green).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we used RS fMRI to determine the speci-
ficity of information carried by sensory andmotor systems during
conceptual processing of actions. Of primary interest was whether
brain regions involved in performing movements and perceiving
visual motion, two areas of the brain often engaged by action con-
cepts (Hauk et al., 2004; e.g., Kable et al., 2002), were sensitive
to changes in the exemplar or representational format of pairs of
action images.
Our results reveal strikingly different response patterns
between these two brain areas: while the visual motion ROI exhib-
ited RS only for identical photographs of actions, suppression
occurred in the motor movement ROI for repetitions of the same
and alternate exemplars of an action, irrespective of the format.
This result suggests that neural activity within these sensorimo-
tor regions during semantic tasks represents information about
actions at different levels of specificity. On the one hand, during
comprehension of static depictions of actions, voxels that respond
strongly to visual motion appear to encode information highly
specific to a particular exemplar of an action or particular repre-
sentational format: only when the prime and target images were
identical and conveyed many perceptual details about the actor or
action context did we observe RS within the visual motion ROI.
Because this region was strongly active for all conditions, it cannot
be the case that some conditions merely failed to activate visual
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FIGURE 5 | Whole-brain analyses contrasting Picture/Picture(Different)
(red/yellow) and Drawing/Drawing(Different) (blue/light blue) trials.
The group-level location of visual-motion-preferring voxels is shown in
green. Coordinates reported in MNI standardized space.
motion areas at all. Instead, neural responses to action concepts
within this area preserve detailed information about the specific
instance of an action; different actors and/or representational for-
mats activate different neural representations. Furthermore, we
did not observe RS when prime and target images were identical
schematic drawings. Thus, the absence of perceptually-rich details
in schematic drawings may result in a more variable response
within areas specialized for visual motion, even across repeated
instances of the same schematic drawing.
Although we focused on the activation of visual motion areas
by conceptual processing of static action images, our results
accord with other studies on the response of area MT+ to dif-
ferent types of visual motion. In particular, this area is sensitive
to changes in the speed, direction, and velocity of low-level visual
motion (Wall et al., 2008; Lingnau et al., 2009; Cardin et al., 2012;
Weigelt et al., 2012). Thus, to the extent that different exemplars
of an action or different representational formats convey actions
performed at different speeds, in different directions, etc., the
response within visual motion regions may differ.
Yet, our results are at odds with two prior studies investigating
RS between pairs of dynamic action stimuli (i.e., videos) using a
semantic task (Kable and Chatterjee, 2006;Wiggett and Downing,
2010; but see Grossman et al., 2010). In both of these studies, area
MT+ was insensitive to changes in the actor and thus responded
similarly as long as the same action was repeated (e.g., “kick-
ing”). Given that both of these studies used stimuli that contained
actual visual motion, an alternative explanation of the present
results is that area MT+ exhibits a narrower range of responses to
static images than dynamic action stimuli. Although static images
engage this area, they may do less strongly and with less variabil-
ity than dynamic depictions of actions. If so, then the absence
of RS to alternate exemplars within the visual motion ROI in
the current study may reflect insufficient physiological power to
detect differences between all conditions in this area.
In contrast to the highly-specific effects we observed within
the visual motion ROI, the motor movement ROI exhibited
RS between pairs of images that depicted identical actions and
pairs that depicted alternate exemplars of the same action. This
response occurred both when the prime and target were the same
format (Picture/Picture, Drawing/Drawing) or different formats
(Picture/Drawing). This result suggests that a similar representa-
tion is evoked within the motor system irrespective of the way in
which an action concept is accessed; the same motor simulation
is produced in response to different exemplars of the same action
or to actions presented in different formats.
One way in which this result could arise is if motor simulations
are grounded in person-specific motor programs for actions. In
other words, no matter who I perceive doing an action (e.g., Jack
kicking, Jane kicking) or the format of the input (e.g., a photo-
graph or schematic drawing of “kicking”), my motor simulation
will reflect the way in which I am inclined to kick. Indeed, there
is prior evidence that the involvement of motor regions in rep-
resenting action concepts depends on an individual’s particular
physical experiences (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006; Beilock
et al., 2008). For example, Calvo-Merino et al. (2005) found that
the degree to which expert ballet and capoeira dancers recruited
motor regions during action observation differed when watching
their own style of dance versus the other; the authors conclude
that “. . . action observation evokes individual, acquired motor
representations. . . ” (p. 1247). Similarly, participants’ ability to
recall actions depends on their motor expertise with those actions
(Pezzulo et al., 2010). The present results extend these findings by
suggesting that an action evokes the same person-specific motor
simulation irrespective of the way in which an action concept is
accessed.
However, we note that the degree to which the motor system
participates in representing action concepts at all is also modu-
lated by physical experience (described above) and task demands
(Van Dam et al., 2012). Our recent meta-analysis of neuroimag-
ing studies using action words and action images did not find
consistent involvement of premotor or primary motor cortex in
conceptual processing of these stimuli (Watson et al., 2013). In
the current study, we used a small set of very familiar actions,
and we functionally-localized areas involved in performingmove-
ments within each participant. Therefore, wemay have beenmore
likely than other studies to generate and detect effects within the
motor system during conceptual processing of actions.
Even though participants made manual responses on each
trial, our study design makes it unlikely that the RS we observed
within the motor movement ROI reflects manual response prim-
ing. First, for each participant, we only analyzed activation within
the hemisphere that was ipsilateral to each condition’s expected
response. Thus, results from the motor movement ROI reflect
activation within the hemisphere not responsible for the but-
ton press. Second, the RS effects were not entirely determined
by activation within hand-preferring parts of the motor sys-
tem: we also functionally-localized areas active when performing
foot movements. Finally, we observed significantly different lev-
els of activation within the motor movement ROI for Same and
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Alternate trials. If manual response priming was driving sup-
pression effects, then we would expect no difference between
conditions responded to with the same hand.
We used functionally-defined visual motion and motor move-
ment ROIs rather than ROIs defined anatomically or from group-
level results. However, since the tasks used to define these ROIs
did not require measurable behavioral responses, we cannot be
certain that a given participant was paying attention or perform-
ing the localizer task; indeed, differences in task engagement may
explain why visual motion and motor movement ROIs could not
be identified, or required a more lenient threshold to be iden-
tified, in some participants. Yet, given the potentially variable
functional brain organization of each participant, using ROIs
defined in this way allowed us to more precisely test functionally-
motivated hypotheses (see Saxe et al., 2006 for a similar argu-
ment), i.e., that voxels that participate in more basic cognitive
tasks (processing visual motion, executing body movements)
would encode information at different levels of specificity during
a conceptual task.
We also examined RS effects in anatomically-defined ROIs.
Within two brain areas neighboring visual motion and motor
movement ROIs, we observed RS when the prime and target
image depicted the same instance of the same action, but not dif-
ferent instances of the same action. Instead, within left pMTG,
we observed no differentiation between Alternate and Different
trials, and within IFG, we observed enhancement for Alternate rel-
ative to Different and Same trials. In some respects, these results
are surprising: some researchers have suggested a “graded” view
of embodiment in which more abstract representations of action
meaning are represented in brain areas adjacent to modality-
specific cortices (Thompson-Schill, 2003; Kable et al., 2005;
Chatterjee, 2008, 2010). Therefore, we expected to observe RS for
different exemplars of the same action within left pMTG and IFG.
However, our pattern of results may be consistent with findings
of “repetition enhancement” rather than “repetition suppression”
(Raposo et al., 2006; Kuperberg et al., 2008; see Segaert et al., 2013
for a review). One hypothesis is that while suppression occurs
when the same cognitive process is performed on a prime and
target, enhancement occurs when the target requires additional
processes, like explicit memory retrieval (Henson, 2003).
In the current study, we found significant enhancement for
Alternate trials within IFG and non-significant but numerically
higher activation for Alternate trials relative to Different trials
for each format type within left pMTG. Alternate trials were
also the most difficult for participants. Therefore, it is possi-
ble that verifying alternate exemplars of the same action (vs.
the easier tasks of verifying an identical match or a complete
mismatch) required additional cognitive processing—and neu-
ral activity—within IFG and left pMTG. IFG, in particular,
has been shown to play a role in selecting among compet-
ing representations in memory (Thompson-Schill et al., 1997;
Moss et al., 2005). When determining whether two images
were different exemplars of the same action, participants may
have had to exert more cognitive effort to find the link
between two conceptually similar, but perceptually dissimilar,
instances of an action. Lack of RS and numerical enhancement
within pMTG may similarly reflect participants’ greater need
to retrieve explicit information about actions in the Alternate
condition.
Finally, we investigated at the whole-brain level the degree
to which the brain distinguishes between perceptually-rich pho-
tographs of actions and more symbolic schematic drawings of
actions. Given that they contain more visual details than draw-
ings, pictures unsurprisingly yielded greater activation through-
out early visual cortex. The reverse comparison, however, yielded
greater activation for schematic drawings in two areas of the
brain. First, drawings more strongly engaged the right supra-
marginal gyrus and parts of the superior parietal lobe, a result
in agreement with a recent voxel-based lesion-symptommapping
(VLSM) study from our lab. In this study, stroke patients with
damage to the left or right hemisphere matched categorical spatial
relations among objects (e.g., “above,” “below”) across different
representational formats (i.e., pictures, schematic drawings, and
words) (Amorapanth et al., 2012). Patients with damage to right
supramarginal gyrus were particularly impaired matching spatial
relation words to their corresponding schematic drawings relative
to their corresponding pictures. A recent case study also supports
the view that schematic drawings are processed differently than
perceptually-rich photographs: a patient with simultagnosia, a
condition in which patients are characteristically unable to per-
ceive more than a single object at a time (Luria, 1959), was
better able to comprehend spatial relations between objects (e.g.,
“above,” “below”) when they were depicted as schematic draw-
ings rather than as photographs (Kranjec et al., 2013). Given the
present results as well as neuroimaging evidence for the activation
of right supramarginal gyrus during the naming of spatial rela-
tions between objects (e.g., Damasio et al., 2001), this part of the
brain may be responsible for recognizing the schematic structure
of these pared-down percepts.
We also found greater activation for schematic drawings of
actions relative to photographs in left lateral occipital cortex;
most voxels in this cluster were located anterior to visual motion-
preferring areas, in lateral occipital cortex and the most posterior
aspect of pMTG. This result is consistent with a graded view
of conceptual representation (Chatterjee, 2008, 2010; Watson
and Chatterjee, 2011). Action knowledge derived from visual
motion area MT+ is represented along a temporal posterior-
to-anterior axis in which increasingly abstract information is
represented more anteriorly. Accordingly, a brain area ante-
rior to area MT+ responded more strongly to pared-down,
more symbolic schematic drawings than to perceptually-rich
photographs of actions. We also observed greater overall activa-
tion of the left pMTG ROI for trials that included a schematic
drawing (Picture/Drawing or Drawing/Drawing trials). Together,
these results suggest that more abstract or symbolic depictions
of actions recruit areas adjacent to modality-specific cortices.
Consistent with this claim, we found using a meta-analysis
approach that words referring to actions consistently activated an
area within left middle temporal gyrus anterior to the area asso-
ciated with visual depictions of actions (Watson et al., 2013). The
implication of these findings for embodied accounts of seman-
tic knowledge is that the recruitment of modality-specific—or
other—regions depends on whether concepts are accessed by
more or less symbolic means. More symbolic depictions may
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additionally, or instead, recruit information that is abstracted
from direct experience and represented adjacent to modality-
specific areas.
Finally, we acknowledge that participants’ did not need to
access conceptual knowledge of actions on all trials. When the
prime and target images were identical (Same trials), partici-
pants’ decisions could be based solely on visual similarity. We
note that the RS effects seen in the visual motion ROI suggest
that some inference about the images is being made even when
they are perceptually identical insofar as neural activity in an
area sensitive to visual motion is influenced by static images. A
visual similarity strategy would not work on the Alternate and
Different trials: though prime and target stimuli were visually dis-
similar for both, these trial types required different behavioral
responses. Therefore, participants’ needed to access the mean-
ing of the actions depicted in these images in order to make a
response. Furthermore, the pattern of results suggests that par-
ticipants drew upon action concepts even on Same trials: it is
not obvious why the repetition of visually similar images should
yield decreased activation in the motor movement ROI. Instead,
we suggest that the conceptual similarity of these images—and
images in the Alternate condition—produces RS within themotor
movement ROI.
Understanding the specificity of brain regions to differ-
ent exemplars of actions and representational formats makes
embodied accounts of the semantic system more precise. Here,
we found that sensory and motor systems carried different
amounts of information during conceptual processing of actions:
while visual motion areas preserved exemplar- and format-
specific details, regions involved in performing movements
responded similarly as long as images referred to the same
basic action (e.g., “kicking”). Thus, when the motor system
participates in understanding an action, it may do so by acti-
vating one’s own motor program for that particular action.
Additionally, two brain regions (left lateral occipital cortex
and right supramarginal gyrus) responded more strongly to
more symbolic representations of actions (i.e., schematic draw-
ings) than to concrete ones (i.e., photographs). For embodied
accounts, these data indicate that even outside of area MT+,
the recruitment of posterior brain regions by action concepts
depends on the format of the input. Within lateral occipi-
totemporal cortex, in particular, more abstract representations of
actions may be represented adjacent to modality-specific cortical
areas.
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